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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether or not Class A misdemeanor Information requires 
the written signature of the Weber County Attorney. 
2e Whether or not a warrant is valid and legal when the 
complainant misrepresented the facts justifying the issuance of the same, 
and when it was issued before the alleged crime petitioner was found guilty of-
3. Whether or not the petitioner was denied the due process 
of law. Alsc, whether or not the court lacked jurisdiction over the case. 
REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL OR UNOFFICIAL REPORT OF C^URT OF APPEALS OPINION 
The Utah Court of Appeals filed its Memorandum Decision on 
October 2, 1987, Case No. 870122-CA, in said coijirt. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS 
Article I, Section 12, of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law. 
The Utah Code of Criminal Procedure provides that: 
1. The procedure in criminal cases shall be as prescribed 
in this title, the rules of criminal procedure, ^ nd such further rules 
as may be adopted by the Supreme Court of Utah. (See Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 77-1-2.) 
2. No person shall be punished for a public offense until 
convicted in a court having jurisdiction. (See ptah Code Annotated, 
Section 77-1-4.) 
3. Unless otherwise provided by law, no information may be 
filed charging the commission of any felony or Class A misdemeanor 
unless authorized by a prosecuting attorney. (See Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 77-2-1.) 
4. A criminal action for any violation of a state statute 
shall be prosecuted in the name of the state. A criminal action for 
violation of any county or municipal ordinance shall be prosecuted in 
the name of the governmental entity involved. (See Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 77-1-5.) 
It was ruled in Van Dam v. Morris, 571 p.2d, 1325, as follows: 
City Court does not have jurisdiction over Class A. 
U.C.A., 1953, 76-3-204(1), 78-4-16; U.C.A., 1953, 
78-5-4(3), Laws 1951, c. 58. 
It was ruled in Hakki v. Faux, 396 p.2d, 867, 16 Utah 2d, 132, 
as follows: 
Where prosecution for misdemeanor was begun by complaint, 
proper procedure for invoking original jurisdiction was 
not followed and district court was powerless to act. 
It was ruled in Williams v. Sunrrdt County, 41 Utah 72, 123 
p.938 (1912), as follows: 
Statute law will always prevail over ordinances. 
The decision sought to be reviewed was filed on October 2, 1987, 
by the Utah Court of Appeals by its Memorandum Decision, Case No. 
870122-CA. 
This Court should have jurisdiction to review the decision in 
question by a Writ of Certiorari according to Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-2-2(5). 
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CONSTITOTIONM./STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Following are additional provisions: 
1. The Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, 1, 2, 
7, 10, 12, and Article VIII, Section 10. 
2. The Constitution of the United States, Article III, 
Article IV, and Amendments IV, V, VI, and XTV. 
3. Utah Code Annotated, Section 10-3-703 (1953, as amended). 
4. Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-3-301(4). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Under the provisions (Paragraph 2) of a Decree of Divorce, 
Civil No. 81435, entered in the District Court of Weber County, State 
of Utah, on the 30th day of November, 1982, the petitioner was awarded 
specific rights of visitation from Saturday at 9:00 o'clock A.M. to 
Sunday at 6:00 o'clock P.M. on every other weekend with his minor 
child (Tape). 
Because the petitioner had been denied visitation rights on 
many occasions by his former wife who had been awarded custody and 
control of the minor child of the parties, the petitioner found it 
necessary to obtain an Order on Order to Show Cause to assure him of 
his visitation rights every other weekend (Tape). 
In Paragraph 2 of the Order on Order to Shew Cause entered 
November 2, 1983, each of the parties is to henceforth specifically 
comply with the terms and provisions of the divorce decree heretofore 
entered in the above entitled matter, and particularly as regards 
child visitation (Tape). 
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On the Saturday morning of June 1, 1985, a regularly scheduled 
visitation weekend pursuant to the divorce decree, the petitioner picked 
up the minor child at 9:00 A.M., kept the child until Sunday, June 2, 
1985, when he returned the minor child to the child's mother's residence 
at 6:00 P.M. (Tape). 
The child's mother was not at her residence at 6:00 P.M. on 
Sunday, June 2, 1985, when the petitioner returned the child (Tape). 
The petitioner waited for 20 minutes or more; and when the 
child's mother did not return, the petitioner took the child with him 
to Logan, Utah, because he had other children (three) that the petitioner 
was responsible for returning to Logan that night (Tape). 
Previous to the petitioner's visitation, the child's mother 
had suggested that the petitioner (the father) keep the child for one 
extra day so the mother could attend a beauty shew at the Raddison Hotel 
in Ogden, Utah (Tape). 
The petitioner declined because it did not "specifically" 
comply with the Decree of Divorce and the difficulties encountered on 
previous occasions (Tape). 
The following morning, Monday, June 3, L985, the child's 
mother appeared at the child's grandmother's residence in Roy, Utah, 
where the child's father, the petitioner, keeps the child at night 
when she is his custody during visitation periods, and demanded the 
child (Tape). 
The petitioner told the child's mother that he had not 
finished feeding and bathing the child (Tape). 
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The child's mother again demanded the child be given to her 
at that time (Tape). 
The petitioner told the mother that if she wanted to take the 
childf she should obtain a court order and bring the sheriff with her 
when she comes back to get the child. This occurred at approximately 
8:30 A.M. (Tape). 
A short time later the mother returned without an order from 
the court, but with a Roy City police officer whan the petitioner did 
not see when he answered the door. When the petitioner saw the officer, 
he was startled. He then told the officer to bring the proper court 
papers and the sheriff (Tape). 
The Roy City police officer and the child's mother left the 
child's grandmother's hone without the child (Tape). 
The police officer, upon the wife's complaint, obtained a 
warrant for the petitioner's arrest on a complaint of Custodial Inter-
ference at approximately 11:00 A.M., and returned to the grandmother's 
heme and found the petitioner and child were no longer at the residence 
(Tape). 
The petitioner arrived at that same residence that evening 
and was informed by the child's grandmother that the police officer had 
a warrant for his arrest (Tape). 
When the petitioner arrived at the Roy residence, he imme-
diately called the Roy City Police Department and asked for Officer 
Bell, according to the message that had been left for the petitioner 
(Tape). 
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The petitioner was told that Officer Bell was off duty for 
the day (that Monday). The petitioner got in touch with Officer Bell 
the following day (Tuesday). The petitioner was informed by Officer 
Bell to come to the Roy City Police Station with the child on 
Wednesday (Tape). 
The petitioner agreed with Officer Bell and did as he was 
instructed (Tape). 
On June 3, 1985, an arrest warrant was issued on an Informa-
tion signed by petitioner's ex-wife, Carol Olson, and was given to 
Officer Donahoo to serve on the petitioner. It is a fact in this case 
that the arrest warrant and the Information filed against the petitioner 
were issued before the purported act upon which conviction was made even 
occurred. The conviction, judgment, and sentence should be void, for 
lack of jurisdiction, as a matter of law, and should constitute an 
unconstitutional denial of due process of law and equal protection of 
law under the Constitution of the State of Utah and the Constitution of 
the United States of America. 
On the afternoon of June 5, 1985, the petitioner appeared 
voluntarily at the police department, was booked, taken to court, and 
arraigned on the charge of Custodial Interference under the Roy City 
Ordinance, specified in the Information as a Class "B" misdemeanor. 
Custodial Interference is a Class "A" misdemeanor. A non-jury trial 
was held on June 19, 1985, and the Roy Circuit Court in and for Weber 
County, State of Utah, entered a conviction upon a decision by the 
court of "Guilty." The court failed to obtain jurisdiction and lacked 
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jurisdiction to prosecute the petitioner on the Information alleging 
that the petitioner ccmmitted a Class "B" misdemeanor when, as a matter 
of law, at the time the offense was alleged to have occurred, it was 
a Class "A" misdemeanor under the laws of the State of Utah; therefore, 
the Roy City Ordinance 11-3-4 (1) was void at the arraignment and at the 
trial which took place. 
The Information was unlawful and failed to give the court 
jurisdiction to try the petitioner on the charge of Custodial Interfer-
ence," a Class "A" misdemeanor, under the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended), Section 76-5-303, superseding and voiding 
all municipal ordinances in conflict therewith as a matter of natural 
operation of law wherein all city ordinances in conflict with the laws 
of the State of Utah are necessarily void. 
Class "A" misdemeanors cannot be prosecuted in the name of a 
municipal corporation or a county, but can only be prosecuted in the name 
of the State of Utah, and only upon an Information approved by the 
prosecuting attorney authorized to prosecute in the name of the State 
of Utah. 
Prosecution of a person accused of conmitting a Class "A" 
misdoneanor under the provisions of a state statute by commencing a 
prosecution against the accused under provisions of a city ordinance 
holding the act a Class "B" misdemeanor is an unconstitutional denial 
of equal protection of the law of the state, there being a conflict of 
law between the state statute and the city ordinance, subjecting the 
petitioner to different punishment for the same act in different 
jurisdictions. 
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When an act constituting a Class "A" misdemeanor is prosecuted 
as a Class "B" misdemeanor denying the petitioner of protections he 
would have if charged with committing the Class "A" misdemeanor, he is 
not prosecuted according to law and is denied due process of law, in 
violation of the Constitution of the State of Utah, Article 1, Sections 
7 and 12, and other provisions therein, and also in violation of the 
Constitution of the United States of America, Article of Amendment IV, 
V, VI, and XIV. 
The City of Roy, Utah, is a municipal corporation_and is 
limited by Utah statute to enact ordinances for public offenses of 
Class "B" misdemeanors or lesser offenses only, unless specifically 
authorized by statute, by Utah Code Annotated, Section 10-3-703 (1953, 
as amended), which states: 
Unless otherwise specifically authorized by statute, 
the governing body of each municipality may provide 
a penalty for the violation of any municipal ordinance 
by a fine not to exceed the maximum Class B misde-
meanor fine under § 76-3-301 or by a term of 
imprisonment up to six months, or by both the fine and 
term of imprisonment. 
Under the provisions of Section 76-3-301(4), it states: 
A person who has been convicted of an offense may be 
sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding $299 when the 
conviction is of a Class B or C misdemeanor or 
infraction. 
Where there is a conflict between city ordinances and state 
statutes, the statutes prevail over the city ordinances. This prin-
ciple was declared in Williams v. Summit County, 41 Utah 72, 123 p.938 
(1912), as follows: 
Statute law will always prevail over ordinances. 
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Jurisdiction of the circuit courts is established by Section 
78-4-5(3) and states: 
The circuit courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction of 
all cases arising under or by reason of violation of 
any municipal ordinance involving persons 18 years of 
age and over in those municipalities in which a municipal 
department of the circuit court exists or has been 
created. 
Roy City has such a department. 
Municipalities do not have power to pass ordinances to impose 
penalties for offenses which are classified by statute as Class "A" 
misdemeanors, and circuit courts do not have statutory jurisdiction to 
try offenses classified as Class "A" misdemeanors in the municipal 
departments of such courts. 
City court does not have jurisdiction over Class "A" 
misdemeanor. U.C.A. 1953, 76-3-204(1), 78-4-16; 
U.C.A. 1953, 78-5-4(3), Laws 1951, c. 58. 
Van Dam v. Mbrris, 571 P.2d 867, 16 Utah 2d 132. 
Where prosecution for misdemeanor was begun by 
complaint, proper procedure for invoking original 
jurisdiction was not followed and district court 
was powerless to act. 
Hakki v. Faux, 396 P.2d 867, 16 Utah 2d 132. 
The act complained of in the Information filed in Case No. 
85-CM-112 in the Roy Department of the Circuit Court in and for Weber 
County, State of Utah, was in the nature of a Class "A" misdemeanor 
under Utah statute, thus requiring an Information to be filed in the 
name of the State of Utah alleging the criminal act, and such Informa-
tion must be signed by a state prosecutor, not a city prosecutor who 
is only authorized to bring criminal actions against defendants in the 
name of the municipality he represents. 
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The Utah Constitution provides at Article VIII, Section 10, 
as follows: 
The powers and duties of county attorneys, and such 
other attorneys for the state as the legislature may 
provide, shall be prescribed by law. In all cases where 
the attorney for any county, or for the state, fails 
or refuses to attend and prosecute according to law, 
the court shall have power to appoint an attorney pro 
tempore. Utah Const. VIII, 10. 
The prosecuting attorney in this case was not authorized to 
bring an action in the name of the State of Utah, nor was the action 
brought in the name of the State of Utah as required by the Utah 
Constitution at Article VIII, Section 18. 
Therefore, the Information was void, the arrest warrant was 
void, the arraignment was void, the trial was void, the conviction was 
void, the judgment, including the sentence of fine for $150.00, 30 days 
in jail, and suspension upon payment and probation, is void on the face 
of the record for lack of jurisdiction and should be vacated as a matter 
of law because the court acted without having jurisdiction over the 
person or the subject matter in this case, and having never obtained 
lawful and constitutional jurisdiction, the prosecution constituted an 
unlawful and unconstitutional denial to the petitioner of due process 
of law, in violation of Utah Constitution, Article I, Sections 7 and 
12, and Articles of Amendment IV, V, VI, and XIV of the Constitution of 
the United States, and also denied the defendant in this case equal 
protection of the law in violation of Article I, Section 2, of the Utah 
Constitution and Article of Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the 
United States of America. 
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The Roy Circuit Court in and for Weber County, State of Utah, 
found a judgirent of guilty in a non-jury trial. Petitioner was sentenced, 
fined, and put on probation - not to interfere with the custody of his 
minor child. 
The Second Judicial District Court in and for Weber County, 
State of Utah, dismissed the appeal and ronanded the case to the Roy 
Department of the Third Circuit Court in and for Weber County, State of 
Utah. 
The Roy Circuit Court in and for Weber County, State of Utah, 
dismissed petitioner's Motion to Vacate. 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Third 
Circuit Court denying petitioner's Motion to Vacate. 
ARGUMENT 
QUESTION NO. 1 
WHETHER OR NOT CLASS A MISDEMEANOR INFORMATION REQUIRES 
THE WRITTEN SIGNATURE OF THE WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY. 
Where there is a conflict between city ordinances and state 
statutes, the statutes prevail over the city ordinances. This principle 
was declared in Williams v. Summit County, 41 Utah 72, 123 P.938 
(1912), as follows: 
Statute law will always prevail over ordinances. 
Jurisdiction of the circuit courts is established by Section 
78-4-5(3) and states that: 
The circuit courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction of 
all cases arising under or by reason of violation of any 
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municipal ordinance involving persons 18 years of age 
and over in those municipalities in which a municipal 
department of the circuit court exists 02: has been 
created. 
Roy City has such a department. 
Municipalities do not have power to pass ordinances to impose 
penalties for offenses which are classified by statute as Class "A" 
misdemeanors, and circuit courts do not have statutory jurisdiction to 
try offenses classified as Class "A" misdemeanors in the municipal 
departments of such courts. 
City court does not have jurisdiction over Class A 
misdemeanor. U.C.A. 1953, 76-3-204(1), 78-4-16; 
U.C.A. 1953, 78-5-4(3), Laws 1951, c. 58. 
Van Dam v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325. 
Where prosecution for misdemeanor was begun by 
complaint, proper procedure for invoking 
original jurisdiction was not followed and 
district court was powerless to act. 
Hakki v. Faux, 396 P.2d 867, 16 Utah 2d 132. 
The act complained of in the Information filed in Case No. 
85-CM-112 in the Roy Department of the Circuit Court in and for Weber 
County, State of Utah, was in the nature of a Class "A" misdemeanor 
under Utah statute, thus requiring an Information to be filed in the 
name of the State of Utah alleging the criminal act, and such Information 
must be signed by a state prosecutor, not a city prosecuror who is only 
authorized to bring criminal actions against defemdants in the name of 
the municipality he represents. The Utah Constitution provided at 
Article VIII, Section 10, that: 
The powers and duties of county attorneys, and such 
other attorneys for the state as the legislature may 
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provide, shall be prescribed by law. In all cases 
where the attorney for any county, or for the state, 
fails or refuses to attend and prosecute according 
to law, the court shall have power to appoint an 
attorney pro tempore. Utah Const. VIII, 10. 
Jurisdiction of the circuit court is established by 78-4-5(3). 
Municipalities do not have power to pass ordinances to impose 
penalties for offenses which are classified by statute as Class "A" 
misdemeanors, and circuit courts do not have statutory jurisdiction to 
try offenses classified as Class "A" misdemeanors in the municipal 
departments of such courts. 
QUESTION NO. 2 
WHETHER OR NOT A WARRANT IS VALID AND LEGAL WHEN THE 
COMPLAINANT MISREPRESENTED THE FACTS JUSTIFYING THE 
ISSUANCE OF THE SAME, AND WHEN IT WAS ISSUED BEFORE 
THE ALLEGED CRIME PETITIONER WAS FOUND GUILTY OF. 
Petitioner was deprived of equal protection of the law on an 
Information signed by his ex-wife, Carol Olson, not by a county attorney, 
which was used to obtain an arrest warrant before the purported act upon 
which conviction was made occurred. Petitioner was convicted of a crime 
that happened after the arrest warrant had been issued. Roy City was 
acting beyond the scope of its power at the time it commenced the 
prosecution, and the case was not properly before the court, leaving 
the court without jurisdiction over the defendant or the subject matter, 
and therefore the conviction and judgment are void on the face of the 
record. The conviction and judgment are contrary to law and violate 
the Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, 1, 2, 7, 10, 12, and 
Article VIII, Section 10, and violate the equal protection, due process, 
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and rights of an accused, clauses of the Constitution of the United 
States under Article III, Article IV, and Amendments IV, V, VI, and 
XIV. The said Information was knowingly misrepresentative of the facts 
to obtain the said warrant. 
QUESTION NO. 3 
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WAS DENIED THE DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW. ALSO, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT 
LACKED JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE. 
The powers and jurisdiction of the circuit court are derived 
from laws made pursuant to the Utah Constitution which are not contrary 
to the Constitution of the United States of America. The conviction in 
this case was made contrary to the laws of Utah and in violation of the 
Utah Constitution, and denied the petitioner of rights guaranteed, pro-
tected, and secured by the Constitution* of the State of Utah and the 
laws and Constitution of the United States of America. Reversal as a 
matter of law and the Roy City Ordinance under which the improper 
prosecution took place be declared void on the grounds it is unconsti-
tutional and denies both due process of law. No proper information by 
an authorized officer in the State of Utah was filed, and different 
punishments are provided for the same conduct pursuant to legislative 
action of the State legislature and governing body of Roy City and all. 
Article I, Section 12, of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah, provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law. The appellant was so deprived of 
his liberty without due process of law and was held to answer for a 
crime that was improperly before the court. Class "A" misdemeanor 
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cannot be prosecuted in the name of a municipal corporation or a county, 
but can only be prosecuted in the name of the State of Utah, and only upon 
an Information approved by the prosecuting attorney authorized to prose-
cute in the name of the State. 
The defendant-appellant in this case was deprived of his 
constitutional right to due process of law under both the Utah and the 
United States Constitutions and was put in the untenable position of 
being without counsel at a critical stage of his appeal. Petitioner's 
attorney refused to assist or "put the judge in the hot seat," as said 
attorney stated. The Roy City Attorney told the clerk that the 
respondent could not have transcripts to perfect his own appeal because 
he was not an attorney. Petitioner was left to his own imagination 
and devices in order to perfect his appeal, which was dismissed by the 
district court before a brief could be perfected and filed in compliance 
with the constitution which sets a Glorius Standard Founded in the 
Wisdom of God. The conviction in this case was made contrary to the 
laws of Utah and in violation of the constitutions of the State of Utah 
and the United States of America. 
The petitioner hereby respectfully requests that this Court 
grant him a one-year extension of time within which to perfect a proper 
Brief and within which to demand a responsive Brief from the respondent 
herein, and for the reason that petitioner intends to properly present 
the case. 
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of October, 1987. 
FRANCBOT L. OLSON, PETITIONER 
1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I personally delivered the following 
on this 30th day of October, 1987: Four copies of the foregoing 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari (with one bearing my original signa-
ture) to the office of DEBORAH BADGER, Deputy Roy City Attorney, 
attorney for respondent, 5051 South 1900 West, Roy, Utah; and ten 
copies of the said Petition for Writ of Certiorari (with one bearing 
my original signature) to the Utah Suoreme Court Clerkfs Office, State 
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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OCT 0 21987 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Timothy M. Shea 
OO0OO Cteffe of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeal 
Roy C i t y , 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Franchot Olson, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Before Judges Billings, Davidson and Garff (On Law and Motion) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not for Publication) 
Case No. 870122-CA 
PER CURIAM: 
This case is before the Court on the motion of respondent 
to strike appellant's brief and dismiss the appeal. We grant 
the motion to strike appellant's supplemental brief and the 
Court, on its own motion, affirms the order of the Third 
Circuit Court denying appellant's Motion to Vacate. 
Appellant Franchot L. Olson ("Olson") was convicted of 
custodial interference, a Class B misdemeanor under a municipal 
ordinance, in a non-jury trial held on June 19, 1985. Olson 
was sentenced on June 9, 1985, and appealed the conviction to 
the district court. The Second District Court dismissed the 
appeal for lack of prosecution on December 27, 1985. On 
February 13, 1987, defendant made a "Motion to Vacate" the 
conviction which was denied by the circuit court on March 18, 
1987, and Olson initiated the present appeal. 
On June 24, 1987, this Court ordered Olson to file a 
supplemental brief "fully complying with Rule 24 of the Rules 
of the Utah Court of Appeals and including citations to the 
relevant portions of the record," Olson's Supplemental Brief 
contains citations that are apparently references to a 
transcript of the 1985 trial. That transcript is not, however, 
a part of the record before this Court, nor is the present 
appeal an appeal from the 1985 conviction. The only issue 
before this Court is whether the circuit court erred in denying 
appellant's Motion to Vacate. The supplemental brief will be 
disregarded pursuant to Rule 24(k) because it contains 
"irrelevant" and "immaterial" matters that could only have been 
raised on the direct appeal from the conviction. This Court 
proceeds to consider the Brief of Appellant filed on May 6, 
1987, to the extent that it pertains to the ruling of the Third 
Circuit Court on Olson's Motion to Vacate, 
Olson's principal claim is that the 1985 judgment and 
sentence of the Third Circuit Court are void because that court 
lacked jurisdiction. Olson was prosecuted under a Roy City 
ordinance prohibiting "custodial interference", a Class B 
misdemeanor. The action was initiated by an Information signed 
by the complaining witness before a circuit court judge. Olson 
contends that the offense charged was a Class A misdemeanor 
under state statutes and thus the information must have been 
"authorized by the prosecuting attorney" pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-2-1(1982). Olson further contends that the offense 
was a violation of a state statute and must be prosecuted in 
the name of the State pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-5(1982). 
Olson's claims that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction 
are clearly without merit. Municipalities are specifically 
empowered by statute to pass ordinances prescribing penalties 
not exceeding those prescribed for a Class B misdemeanor. Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-3-703 (1986). The offense charged was a Class B 
misdemeanor under the municipal ordinance. Accordingly, the 
information was not defective under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-2-1(1982). Similarly, because the criminal action was 
initiated under a municipal ordinance, it was properly 
prosecuted in the name of the municipality pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-1-5. Finally, the present case was within the 
jurisdiction of the circuit courts, which Olson acknowledges 
have exclusive jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 
78-4-5(3)(1987) over "all cases arising under or by reason of 
violation of any municipal ordinance involving persons 18 years 
of age and over in those municipalities in which a municipal 
department of the circuit court exists or has been created." 
Under the circumstances of this case, the Third Circuit 
Court correctly concluded that the judgment and conviction were 
not void for lack of jurisdiction, and properly denied the 
Motion to Vacate. 
Olson also contends that the Roy City Ordinance is 
"unconstitutional" or otherwise unenforceable because it is in 
conflict with the state statute proscribing custodial 
interference and, alternatively, that the subject matter of 
custodial interference is preempted by the state statute. 
Although Olson has not made a convincing argument that his 
constitutional rights were violated or that the state has 
preempted the field, those issues are not properly before us. 
The Third Circuit Court found that any challenge to the 
870122-CA 2 
enforceability of the municipal 
pursued in the direct appeal of 
which was dismissed for lack of 
The March 18/ 1987 Order of 
ALL CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
R. W. Garff, Judge 
ordinance must have been 
the underlying conviction, 
prosecution. We agree. 
the Circuit Court is affirmed. 
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IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OF WE3ER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROY CITY, a Municipal corporation, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
FRANCHOT OLSON, 
Defendant/Appellant• 
RULING ON APPEAL 
Case No. 1S988 
This case having been submitted on the default of the 
appellant to prosecute his appeal, it is ordered that said appeal 
be, and the same is, dismissed. 
tTt \m *•* *m «* «>• 
the Third Circuit Court for enforcement of judgment. 
DATED this 2. "7 day of December, 1985. 
RONALD 0. HYDE, Judae 
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WEBER, ROY DEPARTMENT 
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vs. 
:RANCHOT OLSON, 
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